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Great Expectations:  Cost-Utility Models as Decision Criteria  
Paul C Langley, PhD 
College of Pharmacy, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis MN 
 
Abstract 
One of the more puzzling features of published claims for cost-effectiveness is the popularity of claims presented in terms of quality 
adjusted life years (QALYs). Despite the popularity of QALYs as the ‘gold standard’ outcome measures among academic audiences, 
professional groups and a number of single payer health care systems, there is no evidence to suggest that cost-per-QALY based 
claims have ever been assessed, either through experimentation or observation, to support formulary decisions. In part this stems 
from the fact that cost-per-QALY claims are typically not expressed in evaluable terms; it also stems from the fact that, despite the 
plethora of QALY publications, QALYs are not collected on a regular basis by any health care system as part of administrative claims 
or electronic medical records. In the US QALYs have typically been ignored by health care decision makers. Given this, the continuing 
popularity of utility-based measures for studies published in the leading pharmacoeconomics journals is difficult to understand. One 
possible explanation is that those promoting QALY claims are locked into a relativist position that defends the publication of 
nontestable product claims. A position that is reinforced by recommendations from ‘peer organizations’ such as the Academy of 
Managed Care Pharmacy (AMCP) in their promotion of their Format for Formulary Submission standards which support the role of 
lifetime cost-per-QALY modeled imaginary worlds or thought experiments. Another explanation is that QALYs have been taken at 
face value with little though given to how they might be implemented to support both initial formulary decisions as well as ongoing 
disease area therapeutic class reviews. The purpose of this review is to put the case that the continued emphasis on cost-per-QALY 
claims has no practical benefit in formulary decision making.  
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Introduction 
Belief in quality adjusted life tears (QALYs) as a gold standard 
in modeled or simulated health technology assessment claims 
is widespread. Support for the QALY is found in academic 
groups, particularly in the US and UK, together with 
professional associations such as the International Society for 
PharmacoEconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR) with 
their recommendations for best practice modeling 1 2 3. 
QALYs have also been the focus for a number of single payer 
health system technology assessment groups such as the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in the 
UK, with its mandatory reference case model, the 
Pharmaceutical Management Agency (PHARMAC) in New 
Zealand, the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee 
(PBAC) in Australia, the Canadian Agency for Drugs and 
Technology in Health (CADTH) and the Health Quality and 
Information Authority (HQIA) in Ireland 4 5 6 7 8. QALYs are 
also a recommended endpoint in the Academy of Managed 
Care Pharmacy (AMCP) Format for Formulary Submissions 
(Version 4.0) 9. 
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The popularity of the QALY as an endpoint, at least for 
academic audiences, can be seen in the frequency with which 
QALY endpoints appear in published claims for cost-
effectiveness in the leading technology assessment journals: 
Value in Health, Pharmacoconomics and the Journal of 
Medical Economics.  In the US, as in a number of countries, 
there is what may be described as a ‘life sciences industry’ 
(a.k.a consultants), who have developed a substantial 
revenue stream from developing clinical cost-effective 
models as part of submissions for formulary evaluation. In 
single payer systems the submissions follow the guidelines 
set out by assessment agencies such as NICE in the UK and 
the PBAC in Australia. In the US there is a well-developed 
process for the development and processing of submissions 
following the standards recommended in the AMCP Format. 
In addition, in the US, there are independently conducted 
cost-effectiveness analyses and recommendations for 
product acceptance, such as those produced by the Institute 
for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER) which has modeled 
itself on the NICE scoping, modeling and assessment 
process 10.  
 
As far as can be ascertained, given the confidentiality of 
submissions, the ‘life sciences industry’ is wedded to QALYs 
as the primary outcome in their cost-effectiveness models 
with a substantial proportion of submission adopting a 
lifetime cost-per-QALY framework to generate untestable 
claims for cost-effectiveness, prioritization and pricing based 
on evidence constructed within imaginary worlds. 
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At the same time, there appears little interest in QALYs and 
lifetime cost-per-QALY claims from decision makers outside 
the few single payer health systems which have mandated 
QALY standards for formulary submission. There is little 
evidence on which to judge whether the recipients of 
formulary submissions, in particular in the US, actually pay 
much attention to claims expressed in cost-per-QALY terms. 
While this may be put down to the lack of skills possessed by 
the myriad of formulary committees in place with the various 
health systems, with the number growing significantly 
following the implementation of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act from 2010, the more reasonable 
explanation is that the dossier submitted is seen simply as a 
possibly useful information source for assessing the clinical 
merits of competing products. The time and effort put into 
Markov process and event simulation models appears to be 
largely ignored. This is more likely not due to the ‘lack of 
skills’ on the part of recipients, but the more mundane 
explanation that the recipient sees no tangible or practical 
value in the modeled claims.  
 
It is important to note, however, that a number of the QALY 
instruments, notably the instruments in the SF-36 ‘family’ 
have been used extensively in clinical practice, estimating the 
burden of disease and monitoring health outcomes in specific 
disease states 11 . To this extent there is clearly scope for the 
application of the various instruments. It is not the purpose 
here to assess the value of the various QALY instruments in 
these applications. Rather, the purpose of this review is to 
consider why modeled QALY-based claims for cost-
effectiveness, whether they are submitted to formulary 
committees in the US, or to agencies acting as gatekeepers in 
single payer systems, are probably irrelevant to health care 
decisions. This assessment focuses on two questions: (i)  do 
modeled cost-per-QALY claims met the standards of normal 
science and, (ii) how do we account for their continuing 
popularity in published claims for the comparative cost 
effectiveness of pharmaceutical products and devices? In 
respect of the first question the focus is whether the 
construction of a modeled cost-utility claim represents an 
empirically evaluable coherent theory and whether the 
modeled claim facilitates the testing of hypotheses through 
experimentation or observation. In respect of the second 
question the focus is on the analytical and empirical 
standards accepted for the publication of cost-utility models 
and claims made for competing products.   
 
It is worth noting that the terms QALY or health related 
quality of life (HRQOL) are used somewhat indiscriminately in 
the literature. In the present case the focus is on the generic 
QALY measures such as the EQ-5D rather than on disease 
specific instruments that have been labeled as HRQoL 
measures 12. Putting these measures to one side does not 
mean, of course, that a focus on disease specific measures as 
appropriate metrics for patient quality of life may not be 
more appropriate in a clinical setting for judging the merits of 
competing interventions on disease progression and disease 
staging compared to ‘generic’ measures. 
 
The Promise of the QALY 
Belief in the QALY is well established. To believers, QALYs 
allow: (i) comparisons across a broad range of programs and 
disease states; (ii) decision makers to evaluate the 
opportunity costs of new programs; (iii) a disparate number 
of outcomes measures that may characterize a disease 
intervention to be collapsed into a single summary measure 
that incorporates simultaneously mortality and morbidity; 
and (iv) the user to attach values to outcomes with the more 
important outcomes more heavily weighted 13.  
 
The technical case for the QALY rests on the measurement of 
utility.  In economics utility theories have an established 
provenance. The von Neumann-Morgenstern prescriptive 
axioms of cardinal utility theory have attracted a substantial 
literature over the past 60 years on the credibility of the 
axioms, alternative preference measures, the impact of 
uncertainty and the merits of scaling versus choice response 
methods 14.  Aficionados of utility measurement have a 
choice between direct measures of health states such as the 
variants of the rating scale, standard gamble and time trade 
off as opposed to a number of multi-attribute health status 
classification systems with preference scores. The latter 
including the Quality of Well-being Scale (QWB), the various 
incarnations of the Health Utilities Index (HUI), the EuroQol 
measures (EQ-5D) and constructs drawn from the SF family of 
instruments (e.g., SF-6D) 15 16.  
 
Although there has been a general acceptance of the QALY 
methodology, doubts have been raised over the years 
concerning the accuracy and reliability of health 
preferences 17. Most recently, the ECHOUTCOME project, 
conducted in four European countries (the UK, France, 
Belgium and Italy) focused on testing the validity of four key 
hypotheses that form the basis of multiattribute utility 
theory. A total of 1,361 subjects were asked to express their 
preferences regarding hypothetical health states. The study 
found that observed and calculated utility values derived 
from combining different health states and time durations 
were significantly different. The authors concluded that as 
the expressed preferences were not consistent with the 
underlying QALY assumptions, the QALY multiplicative model 
was an invalid measure 18. In response NICE called the study 
‘limited’ and maintained the measure used in its evaluations 
(the EQ-5D), although imperfect, was  ‘the best measure 
anyone has yet devised for this’ 19.  
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Towards a QALY Consensus? 
In 2009 ISPOR held a Development Workshop on “Moving the 
QALY forward: Building a Pragmatic Road”. Following the 
presentation of a number of papers ranging from concerns 
and detailing challenges to the QALY metric to the benefits 
(or otherwise) of QALYs as a resource allocation tool, 
Drummond et al reported on the deliberations of a workshop 
consensus group to identify common ground on key issues 20. 
Putting on one side the questions of how QALYs should be 
measured or which instruments should be used, the 
committee decided that the best way forward was to reach 
agreement on high level principles and issues for further 
research.  
 
The consensus issues were: 
• QALYs are only one health-based input to health and 
health-care decisions 
• QALYs can be used at various levels in the health 
care system 
• QALYs do not encompass all aspects of well-being 
• Both ex ante preferences for health states and 
experience of health states may count 
• Distributive issues need to be addressed using QALYs 
in some settings (e.g., the US) 
• Developing a reference method of estimating QALYs 
In conclusion, it was noted that it was not possible to agree 
on a single way forward yet the majority opinion was that for 
the QALY to gain wider acceptance by decision makers then 
efforts had to be made to develop a reference method for 
estimating QALYs.  
 
If this remote possibility is to occur then we need to agree on 
the choice of QALY. This is a virtually impossible task: In single 
payer systems such as the UK, New Zealand and Ireland, the 
choice is straightforward: the instrument is mandated by the 
assessment agency (which in these cases comes down to the 
EQ-5D or a local variant). If the choice is between the various 
multi-attribute instruments the potential user must be aware 
that the individual instrument constructs are quite different. 
First, they vary in the number of health dimensions included, 
the number of levels captured in each health dimension and 
their severity. Second, they differ in the population surveyed 
to elicit preferences for health states and in how the 
preference score is derived. Finally, they vary in how the 
preference data were translated into a preference score. Not 
surprisingly, similar patient groups can generate quite 
different scores depending on the instrument used. 
 
There is little guidance as to which instrument should be 
considered most appropriate in target disease states for 
specific populations. While there is evidence that some 
measures ‘travel well’ in addressing different populations, at 
least within countries such as the US,  considerable effort has 
been put into developing ‘country specific’ measures where 
the local population is surveyed to elicit local preferences for 
health states. 
 
The result is that we now have a number of instruments to 
choose from. Each instrument has its supporters who argue 
for its relevance and its ability to capture clinically meaningful 
differences in health state interventions and quality adjusted 
life years saved. Considerable efforts have also gone into 
crosswalking instruments with little apparent success or 
agreement on the appropriate techniques. 
 
Since the release of the Drummond et al consensus report 
little appears to have been accomplished, at least from the 
ISPOR perspective, on constructing ‘the pragmatic best road 
forward’.  There has been little effort towards agreeing on 
the need for, let alone the construction, of a reference 
method for QALYs. The obstacles are formidable (and 
understandable). First, there is no agreement on whether or 
not it is even possible to agree on a reference standard given 
the diversity and incompatibility of the various QALY 
measures; a situation that is no different to the plethora of 
patient reported outcomes instruments that characterize 
various disease states. Second, it is doubtful, even within a 
health care system whether agreement could be reached on 
the choice of QALY instrument and the preferences for the 
defined health states. Third, unless a QALY metric is 
established as a process or outcomes measure for quality 
assessment, there is little chance that any health care system 
would invest resources in capturing QALYs from a specific 
instrument on a regular basis. Fourth, the chance that a QALY 
quality metric would be mandated in the US is effectively 
zero. This is made abundantly clear in the Affordable Care 
and Patient Protection Act (2010) which requires that the 
Patient Centered Outcomes Research Group (PCORI) exclude 
discounted cost-per-QALY or similar discounting measures 
and threshold values for priority setting in health care, 
although the Act does not define a QALY 21.  Although QALYS, 
as Adler points out, have been used by many administrative 
agencies in the US in making regulatory decisions, the ACA 
objection is that it disadvantages people with disabilities 22. 
Irrespective of the merits, and potential for ambiguity, in the 
ACA case, the point worth noting is that nowhere in the ACA 
is the issue of measurement and the potential for evaluating 
QALY-based claims raised. Finally, there is the issue of the 
anchoring on the QALY in death vs. perfect health. For the 
majority of disease states death seems a remote possibility 
with the relevant metric the clinical improvement toward 
‘perfect’ health.  
 
 Imaginary Worlds and the Reference Case 
As issue that was not addressed in the ISPOR Development 
Workshop, and continues to be put to one side at the present 
is the status of modeled claims, in particular those involving 
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cost-per-QALY comparative effectiveness claims. In the last 
10 to 15 years there have been hundreds of modeled claims 
published which present constructed claims for the relative 
merits of one product over another. The question which has 
been ignored is whether the particular QALY-based claims 
meet the standard of normal science: are they testable and 
are they replicable. 
 
If the NICE reference case is taken as the exemplar reference 
case then there is little if any chance that claims based on a 
reference case would meet these standards 23. The NICE 
reference case is now well established and has been applied 
to a substantial number of pharmaceutical products, typically 
through single technology assessments (STAs). Submissions 
from manufacturers are required to meet reference case 
standards in modeling or simulating the natural course of a 
disease in chronic disease states. This involves a modeling 
framework, with Markov processes the most popular, 
projecting direct medical costs and QALY outcomes over the 
lifetime of the patient (unless an earlier resolution can be 
justified). Both costs and QALYs are discounted with the 
results presented in incremental lifetime cost outcomes 
terms (ICERs). The models presented are defended in terms 
of their input assumptions and their core mechanism, with 
account taken of uncertainty in the input parameters and the 
choice of modeled health states. The submitted model is then 
reviewed by an Evidence Review Group (ERG), often 
university based, who can accept, modify or create their own 
reference model. The final ‘good housekeeping’ seal of 
approval for the modeled claim is given by the NICE Advisory 
Group.  
 
One interpretation of the NICE commitment to constructing 
reference models is that while they have taken on board the 
arguments of academic advisors and accepted the central 
place of cost-per-QALY claims and willingness-to-pay 
thresholds as driving resource allocation decisions, they also 
recognize that it is not only impractical, but inadvisable to 
actually attempt to validate cost-per-QALY claims.  The 
reference case is designed to support this dichotomy. The 
truth is constructed. The process of assessing the modeled 
claims of manufacturers through the ERG process and the 
final seal of approval by the Advisory Committee are designed 
to demonstrate the ‘scientific’ foundation for decision making 
yet at the same time putting to one side any future attempts 
to evaluate and challenge claims. 
 
The time horizons recommended for cost-per-QALY modeled 
or simulated claims place a further barrier to claims 
evaluation. While lifetime QALY models may have a visceral 
appeal to model builders and decision makers who have 
attended ISPOR workshops and other presentations 
supported by manufacturers, the fact is that such claims are 
imaginary. The lifetime cost-per-QALY requirement excludes 
the possibility of generating evaluable predictions, let alone 
trying to replicate those claims. Indeed, there is no evidence 
to suggest that it was ever seriously intended that the 
reference case would support evaluable predictions. The 
reference case is best seen, therefore, as a blueprint for 
constructing evidence in the framework of an imaginary 
world.    
 
From the decision perspective the reference case gives the 
impression of a well thought through and scientifically 
justified approach to the complex issue of formulary 
decisions. The truth, as defined by the reference case, is 
constructed. The credibility of the claims rest on the 
correspondence of the model or simulation with ‘reality’ as 
initially perceived by the manufacturer, modified or 
challenged by the contracted ERG to generate their ‘reality’ 
and finally reviewed by the NICE Advisory Board to give their 
‘final’ version of reality. At no stage is there any consideration 
given to evaluable claims. This would, quite obviously, be 
impossible given the focus of the reference case on the 
natural course of a disease and the discounted cost-per-QALY 
requirements. Although the preferred utility instrument is the 
EQ-5D, there is no evidence to suggest an interest in actually 
collecting EQ-5D preferences from target populations to 
potentially evaluate claims as opposed to filling in evidence 
gaps in constructing the imaginary worlds. 
 
This does not mean that a modified, short-term version of a 
modified reference case type model could not generate 
evaluable cost-per-QALY claims in, for example, end of life 
therapy interventions. The point is that NICE is not interested 
in evaluable claims. The reference case is not intended to set 
the stage for generating new evidence but to provide a 
framework for price negotiations. Manufacturers are quite 
aware of the reference case as a rite of passage pricing 
model. If they can provide a believable modeled or simulated 
claim for a unit price that generates sub-threshold cost-per-
QALY estimates then they have a good chance of a successful 
price negotiation. If they are unsuccessful then they can 
negotiate alternative pricing and discount arrangements. At 
no stage are either party charged with actually evaluating 
claims; they have no independent check or interest in 
knowing whether the clinical or cost-utility claims are right or 
even if they are wrong. 
 
Imaginary Worlds, QALYS and Pseudoscience 
Against this background, it might not come as a surprise to 
raise the question of whether the construction of modeled or 
simulated reference-type claims for cost-effectiveness should 
be best described as a pseudoscience, or at most a ‘soft 
science’ as opposed to a ‘hard’ science. If we consider the 
difference between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ science the distinction is 
blurred. Science, as Pigliucci points out, is a heterogeneous 
group of disciplines where the degree of precision in 
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predicting events can vary from highly controlled 
experiments in the ‘queen of sciences’ physics to non-
laboratory assessments where the ability to explain and 
predict is much reduced 24 . However, the common thread 
linking these disparate environments is the ability (or the 
commitment) to ‘produce and test hypotheses based on 
systematically collected empirical data [via experiments or 
observation]’.  
 
Pseudoscience  is distinguished from the continuum of 
disciplines that fit into the ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ categorization of 
science by the absence of the three core elements of 
‘science’: (i) an investigation of nature; (ii) the construction of 
empirically verifiable theories; and (iii) testing through 
observation of experimentation. If we consider the NICE 
reference case against these standards then it could be 
argued that while the question of the relative merits of 
competing health care interventions might meet the first 
criteria and while, for the second standard, we could possibly 
argue that the reference case is a creative ‘coherent 
conceptual construct’ but with an unrealized potential for 
generating evaluable claims. Unfortunately, the reference 
case fails the third, and most critical standard, of evaluation 
through experimentation or observation. In short, theories 
are not enough. The failure of the reference case is that it 
excludes empirical testability. Models or simulations that 
conform to the reference case standards, lifetime or long-
term cost-per-QALY claims (appropriately discounted) are not 
science.  
 
A point that is worth considering is whether or not health 
technology assessment was initially conceived as a soft 
science or pseudoscience or whether it has, in Pigliucci’s 
felicitous expression ‘fallen into that category’. It is with the 
emergence from the late 1980s of cost-effectiveness analysis 
that the commitment to hypothesis testing appears to drop 
off the radar screen. Perhaps the key word is ‘validation’. 
Modeled claims are, if we follow the ISPOR standards for 
modeling, to be judged by their correspondence to reality. 
Predictive validation is seen as the strongest form of 
evaluation, yet it can be put to one side with correspondence 
assured through face, internal, cross and external validity 
checks. If the correspondence of the constructed model is 
judged to be significant then it follows that the claims are 
necessarily entailed. Concerns with predictive 
experimentation or systematic observation can be put to one 
side. The fact that the modeled outcomes are expressed in 
terms that are incapable of meeting the standards for 
hypothesis testing adds additional weight. 
 
Perhaps the catalyst for the fall was the publication in 1990 
by the Pharmaceutical Benefits Committee, of the draft 
version of the Australian standards for formulary 
submissions, which were formally released in 1992 25. The 
standards received widespread publicity and were quickly 
emulated in other single payer health care jurisdictions. The 
guidelines made no mention of the need to present claims in 
evaluable terms. The modeled claim, subject to review, was 
accepted at face value. This position has remained unchanged 
throughout the subsequent versions of the guidelines. A 
similar position was taken in guidelines developed 
subsequently for other health jurisdictions. There is no 
evidence of any single payer health system considering the 
merits of evaluable claims in formulary submissions, including 
NICE in the UK and the adoption of the reference case.  
 
A charitable interpretation of this ‘lapse’ might be that, in the 
1990s, those advocating modeled or simulated claims 
recognized the difficulties of evaluating claims in a limited 
data environment. A less charitable interpretation might be 
that there was no pressing interest in evaluation, either from 
agencies such as the NICE and the PBAC or from 
manufacturers who were enthusiastic supports of modeled 
cost-effectiveness claims, yet showing less than enthusiastic 
support for the replication of phase 3 results. At the same 
time there was, as far as can be judged, little interest from 
health systems, notably in the US, in pursuing cost-
effectiveness claims in target patient population. The notion 
of an outcomes based formulary did not emerge until much 
later 26. 
 
A more substantive reason for the continued commitment to 
the construction of imaginary worlds is that there is, perhaps 
inadvertently, no commitment to meeting the standards of 
normal science. In effect, standards for modeled claims are to 
be understood from a relativist perspective. The relativist 
believes that all perspectives are equally valid 27. In their 
advocacy of the equivalence or symmetry principle, from a 
relativist perspective health care decisions are to be 
understood sociologically. No one body of evidence is 
superior to another. There is no need to set standards for 
evaluable claims. For the relativist, the success of a scientific 
research program, in this case one built on models and 
simulations, rests not on its ability to generate new 
knowledge but on its ability to mobilize the support of a 
community committed to developing models and simulations. 
Basing decisions on models and simulations reinforces the 
consensus view that evidence is constructed, never 
discovered. Instead of coming to grips with reality science is 
about rhetoric, persuasion and authority. Truth is consensus 
and truth is constructed. 
 
Cost-Utility an Irrelevant Metric 
Given these professed advantages in a preference-based 
summary score that captures both morbidity and mortality 
across disease states, why have health systems, particularly 
those in the US, been reluctant to embrace this measure in 
evaluating the impact of competing treatment interventions? 
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The academic enthusiasm for developing and comparing 
preference measures, including somewhat inconclusive 
debates on the relative merits of QALYs and DALYs and 
whether QALYs should be discounted, does not seem to be 
matched by an equally enthusiastic embrace of this single 
valued outcome measure by health care decision makers. 
Indeed, the academic and health decision making audiences, 
with a few notable exceptions, appear to be talking past one 
another. The academics are busily publishing non-testable 
comparative product claims couched in cost per QALY terms 
(more often than not funded by pharmaceutical 
manufacturers) while health care decision makers are 
focused on triangulating efficiency, clinical outcomes, and the 
total cost of care to support value claims.  
 
The point that is overlooked is that, irrespective of the 
confidence that we have in the methodological foundations 
of a single measure, the measure is of little interest to 
decision makers if utility measures such as the EQ-5D are 
never systematically collected or have no prospect of ever 
being collected. Can we seriously entertain the prospect of a 
commitment by health administrators to ensure QALYs are 
generated from representative samples of patients going 
forward on an annual or semi-annual basis across disease 
states and clusters of comorbidities? If not, then claims based 
on QALYs are a waste of time unless there is a commitment 
by those making the claim to follow through on data 
collection. A commitment which might be questioned if the 
claims are in long-term or lifetime cost-per-QALY terms with a 
time horizon that matches the course of the chronic disease 
and, as such, are incapable of being evaluated let alone 
replicated.    
 
As far as can be ascertained, there is not a single health care 
system that regularly collects utilities as an outcome 
measure. Putting on one side the issue of which utility 
measure is best suited to the patient population, the absence 
of such measures embedded in electronic medical record 
(EMRs) or other process measures such as administrative 
claims, means that any cost-per-QALY claim has to be 
assessed through a prospective observational study. Rather 
than being able to access EMRs where clinical endpoints are 
reported on a regular basis, a study has to be designed to 
capture the QALY endpoints. In the US, the accountable care 
organizations (ACOs) are a case in point. The process and 
outcomes measures that are in place to support quality 
metric standards make no mention of QALYs. Rather, the 
focus is on disease specific clinical and process measures that 
can be readily captured.   
 
For those who see the abandonment of the QALY as a major 
step backward the answer apparently lies in ‘improving’ the 
measure. Even if an ‘improvement’ were to occur, the 
question still remains: is there any likelihood of the measure 
having a practical role in the allocation of healthcare 
resources outside of the construction of cost-per-QALY 
imaginary worlds?  28 While there are certainly a number of 
initiatives that have been considered including the equity of 
values put on different QALYs by different groups of people 
and attempts to improve the sensitivity of generic 
instruments such as the EQ-5D-5L 29 30.  Other groups, such as 
the National Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care 
(IQWiG)  in Germany employ a modeled efficiency frontier 
(EF) framework rather than QALYs and willingness to pay 
thresholds to facilitate setting maximum reimbursable prices 
for new interventions 31 . In common with the NICE reference 
cases there is no intention that any of the claims made from 
the modeling should be evaluable. 
 
If QALYS are irrelevant for health decision making in the US 
and other countries, why do manufacturers and others 
continue to support modeled claims for comparative cost-
effectiveness expressed in utility terms? Apart from the 
obvious response that they don’t know any better, one 
possibility is that they (or at least their in-house 
pharmacoeconomics group) have bought intro the consensus 
view of the role of non-testable modeled or simulated claims 
as a sustainable marketing strategy.  
 
Transitioning To Evaluable Claims 
Perhaps the most obvious point to make is that if it is possible 
to construct complex lifetime cost-per-QALY models relying 
on Markov processes or discreet event simulations, then it 
should not be difficult to reorient our thinking towards the 
construction of models that generate short-term evaluable 
predictions. Given the effort that apparently goes into the 
construction of lifetime imaginary worlds, as evidenced by 
the effort put into examining the minutiae of modeled claims 
by the ERGs in the UK and their equivalent in Australia in 
reviewing submission to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory 
Committee (PBAC), the demand for a potentially less complex 
and less demanding short-term extrapolation from, say, 
randomized clinical trials (RCTs)  does not seem an 
unreasonably onerous or, indeed, challenging request.  
 
It might also seem obvious that rather than relying on the 
relativistic belief systems of academics advising single payer 
health system decision makers, it would be useful to ask 
health system decision makers in the US what information 
they consider critical in evaluating competing comparative 
clinical and cost-effectiveness claims.  On the clinical side are 
they primarily interested in phase 3 results, focusing on 
quality, adverse events and efficacy? Or are they more 
focused on direct or indirect comparative effectiveness 
claims? As direct head-to-head claims are unlikely to capture 
all comparator therapies in the disease or therapeutic area, 
the focus is then on  the type of indirect claim and proposals 
for how these indirect claims, as provisional hypotheses for 
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anticipated comparative effectiveness in target patient 
populations, are to be evaluated, and over what time 
horizon?  
 
When it comes to comparative cost-effectiveness claims, the 
focus is then the cost side. Is the health system interested 
primarily on claims for resource utilization over the same 
time horizon as the clinical assessment or is the focus on total 
costs? If it is the latter, then a decision has to be made as the 
appropriate unit costs. Is the health system also interested in 
the impact of competing therapies on absenteeism and 
presenteeism? Is the health system interested in the 
comparative impact on adherence and persistence? Is the 
health system interested in the potential impact of socio-
economic status of target populations on clinical outcomes?  
 
If there is agreement that the focus of cost-effectiveness 
claims should be on those claims that are evaluable rather 
than on constructing imaginary worlds, then one way forward 
may well be to consider, as has been proposed on a number 
of occasions, that a submission to a formulary committee 
should be accompanied by a protocol proposing how the 
claims are to be evaluated in the target patient 
population 32 33 34. This ensures a commitment from the 
manufacturer to standing behind the clinical and cost-
effective claims made for the product. It also ensures that the 
claims made can be evaluated, either from identified data 
vendors utilizing retrospective or future tracking data or, if 
necessary from a prospective observational or experimental 
study. Agreement between the health system and the 
manufacturer who is underwriting the study can set the stage 
both for interim and final reports on claims assessment, but 
also for risk sharing agreements and discounting.  
 
To support this proposed transition to evaluable claims, it is 
worth noting recently introduced guidelines for formulary 
evaluation released by the College of Pharmacy, University of 
Minnesota 35. These guideless reject untestable modeled or 
simulated claims, emphasizing the importance of testable 
claims, experimentation and replication. A key feature is the 
requirement for a claims assessment protocol to accompany 
formulary  submissions. Manufacturers are asked to 
underwrite value claims assessment in a timeframe relevant 
to formulary decisions.  
 
Conclusions 
The commitment to the construction of imaginary worlds, 
together with the commitment to QALYs as the ‘gold 
standard’ endpoint, is not a sound base for promoting the 
contribution of cost-effectiveness models and simulations to 
formulary decision making. This is not to deny, of course, the 
expedient role of non-evaluable reference QALY frameworks 
to justify resource allocation decisions in single payer health 
systems. Until questions are raised as to the empirically 
evaluable basis on which decisions are made, those 
advocates of QALY endpoints should be asked to defend their 
commitment to constructed evidence. 
 
A commitment to QALYs as a gold standard should be 
abandoned. Apart from the obvious issues of the inherent 
credibility of assumptions supporting multi-attribute 
preference models and the absence of agreed criteria for 
selecting a ‘superior’ measure (the ultimate gold standard 
QALY), the fact is that health care systems are either 
unwilling or uninterested in capturing utilities and QALY 
estimates as part of their data set. The result is that we have 
spent 30 years in developing QALYs with the belief that, at 
some time a health system such as the UK NHS will commit to 
the regular collection of utilities from patients. There seems 
little prospect that this will occur. Of course, QALYs can be 
generated from national health surveys, but the sample size 
is typically too limited to capture the level of detail required 
to report on disease specific QALY benchmarks, let alone the 
impact of specific therapy interventions. 
 
Under what circumstances will an appeal to the standards for 
cost-effectiveness claims put to one side the relativist claim 
for equivalence? Under what circumstances will those 
supporting modeled cost-per-QALY and similar claims 
attempt to escape from the sanctuary of pseudoscience? 
Given the consensus view of the contribution of modeled or 
simulated claims, the likelihood of an acceptance of the 
standards of normal science seems remote. There is too 
much sunk capital by manufacturers, consultants and 
‘leading’ academic groups for them to abandon modeled or 
simulated, yet untestable, claims. The only impetus for 
evaluation standards will be from health care decision 
makers. Recognition of the fact that submissions from 
manufacturers have been driven by comparative product 
claims which lack credibility may be the catalyst for change.  
 
In retrospect, it is doubtful, that the great expectations for 
QALYs could ever be realized outside of reference case 
imaginary worlds, or the willingness of decision makers to 
suspend belief in the standards of normal science, and 
accepted lifetime cost-per-QALY claims as decision criteria. 
Unless, therefore, a case can be made for short-term and 
evaluable QALY claims, there seems little scope for QALYS, 
and associated cost-per-QALY claims, as inputs to formulary 
decision making. Perhaps, as Pip says to Estella, it has been ‘a 
vain hope and an idle pursuit’36. After over 30 years perhaps 
we can put QALYs to one side and return to clinically and 
quality specific endpoints  in comparative claims for 
pharmaceutical products in disease and therapeutic areas.  
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